

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. GENERAL

A.R. = Anno Hijrac (A.D. 622).
 Ak. = Akkadian.
 Alex. = Alexandrian.
 Amer. = American.
 Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
 Apocr. = Apocrypha.
 Aq. = Aquila.
 Arab. = Arabic.
 Aram. = Aramaic.
 Arm. = Armenian.
 Ary. = Aryan.
 As. = Asiatic.
 Assyr. = Assyrian.
 AT = Altes Testament.
 AV = Authorized Version.
 AVm = Authorized Version margin.
 A.Y. = Anno Yazdagird (A.D. 639).
 Bab. = Babylonian.
 c. = *circa*, about.
 Can. = Canaanite.
 cf. = compare.
 ct. = contrast.
 D = Deuteronomist.
 E = Elohist.
 edd. = editions or editors.
 Eryp. = Egyptian.
 Eng. = English.
 Eth. = Ethiopic.
 EV, EVV = English Version, Versions.
 f. = and following verse or page.
 ff. = and following verses or pages.
 Fr. = French.
 Germ. = German.
 Gr. = Greek.
 H = Law of Holiness.
 Heb. = Hebrew.
 Hel. = Hellenistic.
 Hex. = Hexateuch.
 Himy. = Himyaritic.
 Ir. = Irish.
 Iran. = Iranian.

Isr. = Israelite.
 J = Jahwist.
 J" = Jehovah.
 Jerus. = Jerusalem.
 Jos. = Josephus.
 LXX = Septuagint.
 Min. = Minean.
 MSS = Manuscripts.
 MT = Massoretic Text.
 n. = note.
 NT = New Testament.
 Onk. = Onkelos.
 OT = Old Testament.
 P = Priestly Narrative.
 Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
 Pent. = Pentateuch.
 Pers. = Persian.
 Phil. = Philistine.
 Phoen. = Phœnician.
 Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.
 R = Redactor.
 Rom. = Roman.
 RV = Revised Version.
 RVm = Revised Version margin.
 Sab. = Sabæan.
 Sam. = Samaritan.
 Sem. = Semitic.
 Sept. = Septuagint.
 Sin. = Sinaitic.
 Skr. = Sanskrit.
 Symm. = Symmachus.
 Syr. = Syriac.
 t. (following a number) = times.
 Talm. = Talmud.
 Targ. = Targum.
 Theod. = Theodotion.
 TR = Textus Receptus, Received Text.
 tr. = translated or translation.
 VSS = Versions.
 Vulg., Vg. = Vulgate.
 WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. BOOKS OF THE BIBLE

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.	Ca = Canticles.
Ex = Exodus.	Is = Isaiah.
Lv = Leviticus.	Jer = Jeremiah.
Nu = Numbers.	La = Lamentations.
Dt = Deuteronomy.	Ezk = Ezekiel.
Jos = Joshua.	Dn = Daniel.
Jg = Judges.	Hos = Hosea.
Ru = Ruth.	Jl = Joel.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samnel.	Am = Amos.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.	Ob = Obadiah.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.	Jon = Jonah.
Ezr = Ezra.	Mic = Micah.
Neh = Nehemiah.	Nah = Nahum.
Est = Esther.	Hab = Habakkuk.
Job.	Zeph = Zephaniah.
Ps = Psalms.	Hag = Haggai.
Pr = Proverbs.	Zec = Zechariah.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.	Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.	To = Tobit.
	Jth = Judith.

Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.	Sus = Susanna.
Wis = Wisdom.	Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.	Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
Bar = Baruch.	1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.
Three = Song of the Three Children.	

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.	1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
Mk = Mark.	1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Lk = Luke.	Tit = Titus.
Jn = John.	Philem = Philemon.
Ac = Acts.	He = Hebrews.
Ro = Romans.	Ja = James.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.	1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
Gal = Galatians.	1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Eph = Ephesians.	Jude.
Ph = Philippians.	Rev = Revelation.
Col = Colossians.	

III. FOR THE LITERATURE

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

- Baethgen = *Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
 Baldwin = *Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901-05.
 Barth = *Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 (²1894).
 Benzinger = *Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.
 Brockelmann = *Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, 2 vols. 1897-1902.
 Bruns-Sachau = *Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.
 Budge = *Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols. 1903.
 Daremberg-Saglio = *Dict. des ant. grec. et rom.*, 1886-90.
 De la Saussaye = *Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch.*³, 1905.
 Denzinger = *Enchiridion Symbolorum*¹¹, Freiburg im Br., 1911.
 Deussen = *Die Philos. d. Upanishads*, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].
 Doughty = *Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.
 Grimm = *Deutsche Mythologie*⁴, 3 vols. 1875-78, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882-88.
 Hamburger = *Realencyclopädie für Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 (²1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
 Holder = *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 1891 ff.
 Holtzmann-Zöpfel = *Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*², 1895.
 Howitt = *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, 1904.
 Jubainville = *Cours de Litt. celtique*, i.-xii., 1883 ff.
 Lagrange = *Études sur les religions sémitiques*², 1904.
 Lane = *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, 1863 ff.
 Lang = *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*², 2 vols. 1899.
 Lepsius = *Denkmäler aus Aegypten u. Aethiopien*, 1849-60.
 Lichtenberger = *Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.
 Lidzbarski = *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898.
 McCurdy = *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894-96.
 Muir = *Orig. Sanscrit Texts*, 1858-72.
 Müss-Arnolt = *A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, 1894 ff.
 Nowack = *Lehrbuch d. heb. Archäologie*, 2 vols. 1894.
 Pauly-Wissowa = *Realencyc. der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1894 ff.
 Perrot-Chipiez = *Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité*, 1881 ff.
 Preller = *Römische Mythologie*, 1858.
 Réville = *Religion des peuples non-civilisés*, 1883.
 Riehm = *Handwörterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*², 1893-94.
 Robinson = *Biblical Researches in Palestine*², 1856.
 Roscher = *Lex. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie*, 1884 ff.
 Schaff-Herzog = *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, 1908 ff.
 Schenkel = *Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869-75.
 Schürer = *GJV*³, 3 vols. 1898-1901 [*HJP*, 5 vols. 1890 ff.].
 Schwally = *Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892.
 Siegfried-Stade = *Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT*, 1893.
 Smend = *Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch.*², 1899.
 Smith (G. A.) = *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*⁴, 1897.
 Smith (W. R.) = *Religion of the Semites*², 1894.
 Spencer (H.) = *Principles of Sociology*³, 1885-96.
 Spencer-Gillen^a = *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899.
 Spencer-Gillen^b = *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.
 Swete = *The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
 Tylor (E. B.) = *Primitive Culture*³, 1891 [⁴1903].
 Ueberweg = *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872-74.
 Weber = *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*², 1897.
 Wiedemann = *Die Religion der alten Aegypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, *Religion of the Anc. Egyptians*, 1897].
 Wilkinson = *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
 Zunz = *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*², 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

- AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
 AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
 ABAW = Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
 AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
 AEG = Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
 AGG = Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
 AGPh = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
 AHR = American Historical Review.
 AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
 AJPh = American Journal of Philology.
 AJP = American Journal of Psychology.
 AJRPE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
 AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
 AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
 AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
 APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
 APF = Archiv für Papyrussforschung.
 AR = Anthropological Review.
 ARW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
 AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
 ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
 ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
 ASWI = Archaeological Survey of W. India.
 AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
 BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
 BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
 BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
 BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
 BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
 BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
 BL = Bampton Lectures.
 BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
 BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
 BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
 BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
 BSAA = Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.
 BSAL = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
 BSAP = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
 BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
 BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
 BW = Biblical World.
 BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.

- CAIBL*=Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CBTS=Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CE=Catholic Encyclopedia.
CF=Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS=Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).
CI=Census of India.
CIA=Corpus Inscript. Atticarum.
CIE=Corpus Inscript. Etruscarum.
CIG=Corpus Inscript. Graecarum.
CIL=Corpus Inscript. Latinarum.
CIS=Corpus Inscript. Semiticarum.
COT=Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*²; see below].
CR=Contemporary Review.
CeR=Celtic Review.
CLR=Classical Review.
CQR=Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL=Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DAC=Dict. of the Apostolic Church.
DACL=Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB=Dict. of the Bible.
DCA=Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).
DCB=Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).
DCG=Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.
DI=Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB=Dict. of National Biography.
DPhP=Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWA W=Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi=Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr=Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM=Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
EI=Encyclopædia of Islâm.
ERE=The present work.
Exp=Expositor.
ExpT=Expository Times.
FHG=Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1835).
FL=Folklore.
FLJ=Folklore Journal.
FLR=Folklore Record.
GA=Gazette Archéologique.
GB=Golden Bough (Frazer).
GGA=Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN=Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP=Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GrP=Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV=Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes.
GVI=Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HAI=Handbook of American Indians.
HDB=Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.
HE=Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL=Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI=History of Israel.
HJ=Hibbert Journal.
HJP=History of the Jewish People.
HL=Hibbert Lectures.
HN=Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB=Handwörterbuch.
IA=Indian Antiquary.
ICC=International Critical Commentary.
ICO=International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR=Indian Census Report.
IG=Inscript. Græcæ (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).
IGA=Inscript. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI=Imperial Gazetteer of India² (1885); new edition (1908-09).
IJE=International Journal of Ethics.
ITL=International Theological Library.
JA=Journal Asiatique.
JAFL=Journal of American Folklore.
JAI=Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAOS=Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB=Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JASBe=Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.
JBL=Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS=Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD=Journal des Débats.
JDTh=Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE=Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS=Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC=Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS=Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ=Jenäer Literaturzeitung.
JPh=Journal of Philology.
JPTTh=Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.
JPTS=Journal of the Pali Text Society.
JQR=Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAI=Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
JRAS=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBo=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASC=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.
JRASK=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.
JRGS=Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JRS=Journal of Roman Studies.
JThSt=Journal of Theological Studies.
*KAT*²=Die Keilinschriften und das AT² (Schrader), 1833.
*KAT*³=Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding (really a totally distinct work), 1903.
KB or *K/B*=Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.
KGF=Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCEI=Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh=Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.
LOT=Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP=Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSSt=Leipziger sem. Studien.
M=Mélusine.
MAIBL=Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
MBAW=Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH=Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).
MGJV=Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.
MGWJ=Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MI=Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).
MNDPV=Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR=Methodist Review.
MVG=Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.
MWJ=Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.
NBAC=Nuovo Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC=Nineteenth Century.
NHWB=Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ=North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ=Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ=Notes and Queries.
NR=Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG=Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED=Oxford English Dictionary.
OLZ=Orientalische Literaturzeitung.
OS=Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC=Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).
OTP=Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS=Proceedings of American Oriental Society.

<i>PASB</i> = Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.	<i>SBAW</i> = Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
<i>PB</i> = Polychrome Bible (English).	<i>SBB</i> = Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
<i>PBE</i> = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.	<i>SBE</i> = Sacred Books of the East.
<i>PC</i> = Primitive Culture (Tylor).	<i>SBOT</i> = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
<i>PEFM</i> = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Memoirs.	<i>SDB</i> = Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
<i>PEFSt</i> = Palestine Exploration Fund Statement.	<i>SK</i> = Studien und Kritiken.
<i>PG</i> = Patrologia Græca (Migne).	<i>SMA</i> = Sitzungsberichte d. Münchener Akademie.
<i>PJB</i> = Preussische Jahrbücher.	<i>SSGW</i> = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.
<i>PL</i> = Patrologia Latina (Migne).	<i>SWAW</i> = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
<i>PNQ</i> = Punjab Notes and Queries.	<i>TAPA</i> = Transactions of American Philological Association.
<i>PR</i> = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).	<i>TASJ</i> = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
<i>PRE</i> ³ = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck).	<i>TC</i> = Tribes and Castes.
<i>PRR</i> = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.	<i>TES</i> = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
<i>PRS</i> = Proceedings of the Royal Society.	<i>ThLZ</i> = Theologische Literaturzeitung.
<i>PRSE</i> = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.	<i>ThT</i> = Theol. Tijdschrift.
<i>PSBA</i> = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology.	<i>TRHS</i> = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
<i>PTS</i> = Pali Text Society.	<i>TRSE</i> = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
<i>RA</i> = Revue Archéologique.	<i>TS</i> = Texts and Studies.
<i>RAnth</i> = Revue d'Anthropologie.	<i>TSBA</i> = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology.
<i>RAS</i> = Royal Asiatic Society.	<i>TU</i> = Texte und Untersuchungen.
<i>RAssyr</i> = Revue d'Assyriologie.	<i>WAI</i> = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
<i>RB</i> = Revue Biblique.	<i>WZKM</i> = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
<i>RBEW</i> = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).	<i>ZA</i> = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
<i>RC</i> = Revue Critique.	<i>ZA</i> = Zeitschrift für ägypt. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
<i>RCel</i> = Revue Celtique.	<i>ZATW</i> = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
<i>RCh</i> = Revue Chrétienne.	<i>ZCK</i> = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
<i>RDM</i> = Revue des Deux Mondes.	<i>ZCP</i> = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
<i>RE</i> = Realencyclopädie.	<i>ZDA</i> = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
<i>REG</i> = Revue des Études Grecques.	<i>ZDMG</i> = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
<i>REG</i> = Revue Égyptologique.	<i>ZDPV</i> = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
<i>REJ</i> = Revue des Études Juives.	<i>ZE</i> = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
<i>REth</i> = Revue d'Ethnographie.	<i>ZKF</i> = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
<i>RGG</i> = Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.	<i>ZKG</i> = Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
<i>RHLR</i> = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses.	<i>ZKT</i> = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
<i>RHR</i> = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.	<i>ZKWL</i> = Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft und kirchl. Leben.
<i>RM</i> = Revue du monde musulman.	<i>ZM</i> = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
<i>RN</i> = Revue Numismatique.	<i>ZNTW</i> = Zeitschrift für die neuest. Wissenschaft.
<i>RP</i> = Records of the Past.	<i>ZPhP</i> = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
<i>RPh</i> = Revue Philosophique.	<i>ZTK</i> = Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.
<i>RQ</i> = Römische Quartalschrift.	<i>ZVK</i> = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
<i>RS</i> = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.	<i>ZVRW</i> = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
<i>RSA</i> = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.	<i>ZWT</i> = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.
<i>RSI</i> = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.	
<i>RTAP</i> = Recueil de Travaux relatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.	
<i>RTP</i> = Revue des traditions populaires.	
<i>RThPh</i> = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.	
<i>RTr</i> = Recueil de Travaux.	
<i>RVV</i> = Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten.	
<i>RWB</i> = Realwörterbnch.	

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*², *LOT*⁶, etc.]

would suit the meaning in Ps 18⁵ (=2 S 22⁵) only. Garvie (Hastings' *DB*, s.v.) thinks בל may be for בלל, and בל' philologically changed from בל, the whole meaning 'lord of the forest'—an etymology which, so far as the present writer can see, has nothing to commend it. Hommel (*ExpT* viii. 472) regards it as a transliteration of the Babylonian Belili, with which Cheyne had previously compared it—a deity worshipped in early times who afterwards made a journey to the lower world (cf. Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab. and Ass.* pp. 417, 575, 588, 589, and 593). Baudissin (*ExpT* ix. 40 ff.) and Oxford *Heb. Lexicon* (p. 116a) hold to the etymology בל' בל= 'without worth.' בל' is a good Hebrew root used only in the Hiph. in the sense of 'avail' 'profit.' This etymology suits the great majority of OT passages. Baudissin regards the meaning 'wickedness' as late. Moore remarks ('Judges' [1922] in *Inter. Crit. Com.*) that the etymology is dubious.

This must be said of the comparison of Belial with Belili: Belial is clearly a designation of Sheol in Ps 18⁵, while at the end of the Babylonian poem called 'Ishtar's Descent,' Belili is a sister of Tammuz, whose lover Ishtar rescued him from the under world. If Ps 18 contains an early substratum, or if we may look to poetry, even when late, to preserve archaic usage, we might regard Belial as originally a name for Sheol. Since the shades were unsubstantial beings, Belial as a qualitative genitive might easily come to signify 'worthless,' 'disagreeable,' then 'wicked.' Its application to the arch-enemy in Nahum would also be natural. Briggs ('Psalms,' in *ICC* i. 142, 152) regards 'worthless' as the original meaning, and the application to Sheol as the derived significance. Its real origin is, however, still obscure.

2. Beliar.—Beliar is a later form of Belial, the final liquid *l* having been changed into its kindred liquid *r* in accordance with a phonetic law common to many languages. The earliest occurrence of this form of the name is in the *Sibylline Oracles*, ii. 167 and iii. 63 and 72.* In the former of these passages Beliar is the great evil power of the world, or Antichrist; in the latter, he is represented as an emissary proceeding from Rome. In the *Ascension of Isaiah*, Beliar † is mentioned in the following passages: 1st 9 2^d 31st 13 4th 4. 16. 18 5th 4. 15. He is invariably regarded as the Antichrist, or great king of this world who has ruled it since it came into being. In this character he practically takes the place of Satan; king Manasseh is, for example, said (2^d) to have 'turned in his heart to serve Beliar.' In the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* considerable light is shed on the conceptions of Beliar then current. He is the source of impurity; he sends evil spirits against men; but he cannot overcome a chaste man (Reuben, 2, 4, and 6). His works are to God's law as darkness to light, but the Messiah will bind him (Levi, 18 and 19). He is the source of lying, but he flees from the man who avoids wrath and lies, and the Messiah will wrest from him his captives (Daniel, 5).

The conception of Beliar in this apocryphal literature is identical with that of 2 Co 6¹⁵, where, according to the best attested reading, Paul asks: 'What concord hath Christ with Beliar?'—Beliar being evidently equivalent to Satan, or Antichrist.

The character of Beliar as Antichrist is a natural outgrowth of the personification of Belial in Nah 1st (2¹).

LITERATURE.—*ExpT* viii. (1897) 423, 472, ix. 40 ff.; Bousset, *Antichrist Legend*, 1895, pp. 26, 171, 172; Charles, *Ascension of Isaiah*, 1900, p. 7; Kautzsch, *Apokryphen*, 1900, ii. 461; Garvie, in Hastings' *DB* i. 268 f.; Cheyne, *EBD*, col. 525-527; Kohler, *JE* ii. 658.

GEORGE A. BARTON.

BELIEF.—I. Definition.—'Belief' is the mental state of assurance or conviction, the attitude of a mind towards its own experiences in which it accepts and endorses them as referring to reality, as having real significance or value. In taking

* The variant Beliae arose from the naturalizing of the word as a Greek noun.

† The Ethiopic form, Berial, is a corruption.

over the term from popular terminology, Psychology has had to encounter the difficulties usually involved in such transference. The vagueness and consequent ambiguity of a term as popularly employed tend to cling to it when it passes into the hands of the scientist, and it is only after considerable controversy that its connotation settles down into the definite and stable form necessary for scientific purposes. This has been the case with the term 'belief.' By certain writers, e.g. Sir W. Hamilton, 'belief' has been employed to denote a state of mind specifically differing from that to which the name 'knowledge' is given, namely, that state in which we accept as true a proposition for which rational grounds are not forthcoming. According to Hamilton, we believe first principles or axioms, we know whatever is logically deduced from such. James Mill, on the other hand, assigns the name to every species of assurance and conviction, the assurance of what is before our eyes as of that which we only remember or expect; of what we know by direct perception, as well as of what we accept on the evidence of testimony or of reasoning. To this Bain and others have objected that, in the case of a present reality, belief has no place; it can be introduced only by a fiction or figure. The believing state relates to representative not to presentative experiences. The judgment 'I see the sun' is full fruition, the judgment 'I can see the sun by going out of doors' affords scope for belief or disbelief. All these differing views could no doubt be supported and illustrated by reference to popular usage. But, as J. S. Mill properly pointed out, the strife between philosophers 'is not likely to terminate until they perceive that the real question is, not what the distinction is, but what it shall be; what one among several differences already known and recognized the word shall be employed to denote' (*Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 1872, p. 78 n.). The contribution of Brentano has assisted materially towards this desired end. By his analysis of judgment (*Urtheil*) he has been largely instrumental in giving to the concept of belief definiteness and fixity of meaning—logical connotation in short. 'Judgment,' as regarded by Brentano (*Psychologie*, p. 266 ff.), is the attitude of mind assumed towards suggested fact, either by affirmation or denial. It is to be distinguished from the mere thinking of, the simple awareness of, the suggestion; inasmuch as in the act of judgment there goes with the presented suggestion acceptance or rejection on the part of the subject. Stout calls this state 'the Yes-No consciousness,' and proposes to use the two terms 'judgment' and 'belief' as equivalent. There are methodological objections to this, but the suggestion is nevertheless significant. It is more accurate to say, as Baldwin does, that belief is the subjective side of judgment. This statement represents what may be called the prevalent view among present-day psychologists. In the act of belief, then, the individual conscious subject orientates himself towards reality in one of two ways. Either he accepts the suggestion as applying to, as qualifying, reality; or he refuses it, puts it away from him. This latter aspect of the act it is customary to call 'disbelief.' But, as is now generally recognized, disbelief is a kind of belief which, with reference to the particular suggestion, takes a negative form. It, as much as the affirmative form, entails a given attitude on the part of the subject towards the real. The opposite of belief is not disbelief but doubt.

(1) *Psychological character.*—When we directly inspect or introspect this state of consciousness, we find that it possesses a character akin to that

of an emotional experience. There is a pleasurable sense or feeling of repose, of inward stability, such as comes from the resolution of difficulties, the demolition of obstacles, the harmonizing of conflicting elements. Bagehot has called belief the emotion of conviction. From this point of view, belief may be regarded as a primary psychical experience, a state which cannot be reduced to factors more fundamental than itself. It is contributed to and determined by various psychical factors, but in itself it is distinctive, unique, and unmistakable. It is easily distinguishable from doubt, which, in itself and apart from supporting beliefs, is a disagreeable experience, involving a sense of suspense and strain, of instability and bafflement—a state which the subject normally strives to transcend.

(2) *Belief and the feeling of reality.*—Belief ought to be, but is not always, distinguished from another modification of consciousness, namely, the feeling of reality, or 'reality feeling,' as it is termed by Baldwin, to whom the distinction is due. This is also a primitive and unanalyzable mode of conscious experience. It accompanies simple sense-presentations—a colour, a tone, a smell, etc.; these are 'just there,' coming to us with a vividness and indubitability which put all considerations of accepting or rejecting out of the question. There is no thought of competing or conflicting alternatives; each experience exists, so to speak, absolutely in its own moment and in its own right. To give this state the name of primitive credulity, as Bain does, is to identify different experiences. The 'reality feeling' state, no doubt, furnishes the stuff out of which judgments are formed, but as such it has not arrived at that stage. Judgment involves selection, the definite choice of 'this' from 'other' irrelevant or conflicting so-called facts; and belief, in this regard as the subjective side of judgment, may be called a state of resolved doubt. Now, in the 'reality feeling' state doubt cannot appear.

(3) *Belief and apprehension.*—It is worth while also to insist further on the distinction mentioned above between belief and the mere presence of an idea or complex of ideas, or, as Brentano would say, between 'judgment' and 'apprehension.' The distinction is between thinking of something and accepting that thought as applying to reality. It is possible to entertain an idea, to give it for a time mental hospitality, without coming to the point of definitely assenting to it or definitely refusing to assent to it. We may think, e.g., of Macbeth or Bluebeard, without necessarily involving ourselves, at the time of thinking, in the affirmation or denial of the existence of these personages. The non-scientific person may receive statements as to the speed of light or the distance of the moon from the earth, and feel no obligation to pass a judgment on their truth or falsity. It is no doubt true, as Stout has pointed out, that 'the existence of an object means for us that . . . it forms a determination or qualification of reality in general. Unless the thought of this reality, however vague it may be, is at the same time an affirmation of it, no specific thought of a specific object is possible' (*Analytic Psychology*, i. 112). But this remark affects the case only in the event of the distinction between mere apprehension and belief being drawn so that the latter falls out of cognitive consciousness entirely. It is a relative distinction, in the sense that both members of it must be regarded as aspects of the cognitive act. But, as Stout himself allows, it is ultimate from the point of view of analysis, and is a distinction well worthy of being borne in mind.

(4) *Belief and knowledge.*—It is customary to distinguish 'belief' from 'knowledge,' and some

philosophical writers, as we have seen, have drawn a sharp line of demarcation between them. There is, on epistemological grounds, undoubtedly warrant for the distinction. But this must not lead to the conclusion that knowledge is intrinsically different from belief when these two are considered psychologically. From this point of view we may rather say that knowledge is belief at its highest power.

'To know' is to have the completest assurance, to recognize that which is 'known' as definitely and firmly fixed within a system of fact. We can assign the ground for it, i.e., we can show how it is related to and consists with the other elements of the system. We hold it fast. The high degree of assurance here leads to wrong distinctions as in 'I do not believe, I know.' The correct, if pedantic, statement in such a case would be, 'I know and therefore I believe.' 'Knowledge' refers to the objective grounds on which the subjective assurance (belief) rests. It is clear, however, at the same time that the two states are not conterminous. While it is impossible to refer to a knowledge-state which is not also a belief-state, it is, of course, manifest that not every case of belief is a case of knowledge. Thus, truly enough, knowledge is sometimes referred to as a species of the genus belief. Beliefs are judged to be either true or false. This in itself indicates the wider denotation of the term as compared with 'knowledge.' Here it may not be unprofitable to remark that the passing of such judgments involves reference to criteria which are beyond the purview of psychology. Beliefs, 'false' as well as 'true,' are facts of mental experience, and from the psychologist's point of view both are of equal interest and worth. The question for him is not how they come to be valued as true or false, but how they come to be beliefs—this special kind of mental existent. The justification or condemnation of a belief is a logical or epistemological task. The explanation of this belief is another matter. Belief does not inevitably wait upon knowledge; it is not always ratification of a clear insight into the truth of things. On the contrary, belief as a rule is antecedent to knowledge; proof is an afterthought. It is not, therefore, sufficient to refer to the rational grounds of a belief, in the attempt to explain it; the causes which bring it about, the sources from which it derives its vitality, are to be sought not merely in the region of the logical understanding.

2. *Factors in Belief.*—(1) *The cognitive factor.*—Undoubtedly belief must be in relation to some mode of cognitive consciousness: a sense-percept, a memory-image, an idea or train or complex of ideas. These furnish the immediate points of reference for any belief. The question remains as to how far they may be regarded as the effective causes, the important and central determining factors, in any given case of belief. To put it otherwise, are we to consider the development of belief to be governed by purely cognitive or intellectual conditions?

James Mill, following Hume, may be taken as an example of those who have a bias towards an affirmative answer to this question. H. Spencer and Bain (in the amended version of his view on this subject) follow suit. Hume, who speaks (*Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, § v. pt. ii. 1) of belief as a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than that which the imagination alone is ever likely to attain, seeks to show that the superiority of belief in these regards arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or sense. James Mill devotes his elaborate and suggestive chapter on 'Belief' in his *Analysis of the Phenomena*

of the *Human Mind* to the working out of Hume's hint and to attempting to trace all forms of belief to the 'grand comprehensive law of association.' No instance can be adduced, he boldly says (*op. cit.* p. 367), in which anything besides an indissoluble association can be shown in belief. Thus, for example, the belief that we see extension and figure as well as colour, is referred to the almost invariable and constant conjunction of our visual, tactile, and muscular sensations. So that, when we have the sensation of colour, we cannot avoid having the ideas of extension and figure along with it. There is a certain inner incoherence in this doctrine, as has, indeed, been pointed out by J. S. Mill. The elder Mill, in introducing the illustrations here quoted, states that in these cases it is generally admitted that we receive no sensation but that of modification of light. This at once brings the doctrine of indissoluble association into question, because we have here a case (one of many) in which such an association does not lead to belief. For, those who are interested in these matters, and who follow in Mill's track, do not believe that they see extension and figure, or they declare that they entertain this belief only at times when they are off their guard. There are thus two conflicting attitudes possible with regard to the same fact, and there clearly must be in at least one of the two cases a determining factor other than association. Association cannot be made the key-word with regard to belief any more than it can with regard to knowledge. It should, nevertheless, be recognized here that the operation of association has undoubtedly an influence on many beliefs. It appears, however, that association is effective not so much as a factor in setting up the belief as in conserving and supporting it once it is set up. This is hinted at by Hume (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). When H. Spencer tries to show that association is the central principle, the ultimate mental uniformity here, he is not successful. It is true, as he says, that if certain states of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways, we are obliged to think them in those ways. But this proves nothing; it would be equally true and equally unedifying to state that, if we are obliged to think certain facts in certain ways, then they must absolutely cohere in consciousness in these ways. We cannot solve the problem of belief by the mechanical formula 'indissoluble connexion.' To complain, as J. S. Mill has done, that it leaves no distinction between the belief of the wise and the belief of fools, is beside the mark, because it introduces an epistemological point. But the complaint indicates a point worthy of note in this connexion, namely, that a belief rooted in and supported by an association and widely held may be refused and contradicted by a few who have 'thought more' about the facts in question. And, as more and more people are induced to think with or after the pioneers, the new belief begins to overtop the old and finally almost, if not altogether, obscures it. The familiar case of the belief that the sun moves round the earth illustrates this point. To say that the new belief that the earth moves round the sun is due to a counter-association is to play with words. It is due to the fact that this relation has come to be seen as a necessary part of a whole system of ideas with reference to the physical universe. And it is here that we come upon the most important condition of belief so far as cognitive factors are concerned. The perception of a given element of experience as fitting into and harmonizing with the rest of experience, in so far as this has been thought by us, gives it an irresistible claim upon our acceptance. The requirement of system, of ordered connexion, is the profoundest need of the intellect, and according as

this need is met will belief be induced. Belief determined on such grounds is equivalent to knowledge, and the further discussion of the conditions here would lead us into the heart of the problems of the theory of knowledge. See EPISTEMOLOGY.

(2) *The emotional factor.*—It is manifest, however, that, as has already been pointed out, human beliefs do not always rest upon such grounds. It is not unusual to find belief determined by other considerations than reference to systematic connexion. It has been widely recognized that emotional elements appear as factors in the incitement and sustenance of beliefs. It has been noted that the state of belief has in itself a certain emotional colouring. Thus Hume says that 'the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to the latter, not to the former' (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). But it is not as an aspect of the resultant that feeling is here to be considered, but rather as a determinant of the process leading to that result. The prevailing emotional disposition, the mood of an hour or of an epoch in life, will materially influence the beliefs of the individual. Such influences act mediately. Religious fervour, social enthusiasm, love, anger, *e.g.*, predispose the subject to select and to accept those ideas which harmonize with and nourish the disposition or mood. In the most general aspect of this consideration it is to be noted that in the sanguine, youthful period of life, when vitality is high, belief as a rule flourishes more abundantly than in the colder and more discriminating period of advanced years. Again, as James has pointed out, theories of a pessimistic type, which tend to darken and chill the life of feeling, are not readily or widely believed, even though they may appear satisfactory to the understanding. They meet with an inarticulate, but none the less stubborn, opposition in the region of the emotions. They run counter to the average mood of humanity. On the one hand, the harmony of a particular belief with the emotional mood intensifies and enriches the feeling with which the idea is suffused; on the other hand, with the decay of a particular mood, related beliefs suffer proportionally. With the dwindling of religious enthusiasm, when 'love grows cold,' belief in the objects round which these feelings cluster becomes more feeble, a tendency to criticism, undreamt of in the intenser emotional hours, makes its appearance, and the beliefs readily disintegrate. Bain, in suggesting that the saying of Jeremy Taylor, 'Believe and you shall love,' should more fitly read, 'Love and you shall believe,' has, at any rate, recognized the efficiency of the emotional factor in belief. We believe with the heart as well as with the head. The search for truth itself is supported by its emotional coefficient—love of truth—which, as has been wittily said, is often utilized in order to prove that that which we love is true.

(3) *The conative factor.*—In the volitional or active aspect of conscious experience we find an even more important determinant of belief. This is not correctly separable from the foregoing. The various factors will be found together, in varying measure, in any act of belief; but, for purposes of clear exposition, the conative factor can be treated as though it were separate. At first sight volition seems to have little, if anything, to do with belief. It has been widely recognized since Hume that there is a certain coerciveness in belief; it 'depends,' he says, 'not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure' (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). The experience of being 'compelled to assent' to a proposition is familiar to most people. It is certain that belief cannot be commanded at pleasure, that it cannot be brought forth by a simple fiat of will, in that abstract sense of will. It is nevertheless

true that will play a leading rôle in the constitution of our belief. So impressed by this was Bain, that in his main treatment of this phenomenon (*Emotions and Will*², p. 371 ff.) he maintains that belief is a growth or development of the will—a phase of our active nature. He does not rule out the cognitive factor, he recognizes it in what he terms the intellectual Association of our Experiences; nor does he deny the influence of feeling, but he argues that these are subsidiary to the volitional or conative factor, and maintains that belief is most vitally related to activity or the will. He bases this judgment principally upon the fact that what we believe we act upon. Action is the test of belief. Thus, if a politician declares Free Trade to be good and yet will not allow it to be acted on (there being no extraneous barriers in the way), people say he does not believe his own assertion. To maintain his thesis, Bain is sometimes driven to somewhat extreme measures. He recognizes that there are cases where the connexion between belief and activity is not obvious, and alludes to them as 'apparent exceptions' where, though not obviously, the connexion still exists. 'Many men that will never cross the Sahara desert believe what is told of its surface, of its burning days and chilling nights.' But the connexion with activity here is, he holds, present, for their attitude may be expressed by saying that, if they went to Africa, they would do certain things in consequence of this information. This, as has been suggested (Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, ii. 257), is beside the mark; for where we believe without actual reference to practice, the mental attitude of believing must be actually distinct from the practical attitude. Bain does not show that action is a condition of belief; he only shows that action is an empirical test of belief, and even so he weakens and embroils his position by unnecessarily limiting activity to forms of bodily movement. Granting all that Bain puts forward, we have still to ask with Brentano (*Psychologie*, p. 268) why it is that one idea has an influence upon action and another has not. In short, he shows that action depends upon belief, and not that belief depends upon action. Bain afterwards (*op. cit.*, Appendix, p. 100) briefly recanted this view in favour of a more intellectualistic treatment of belief on associationist lines. In so far as his first position involved the doctrine that belief is wholly volitional in its nature, the recantation was justified. At the same time Bain's discussion did excellent service to the psychology of this subject, in drawing attention to a vital constituent of belief; and his contribution from that point of view has permanent value. It leads us close to the centre of the matter. A brief inspection of the facts of the case brings us to perceive that without beliefs of some kind man cannot maintain himself in the universe at all, and that the fullness of life and the fullness of belief are in a direct ratio. This does not contradict the truth that beliefs are shed as experience advances. They are replaced by deeper and more comprehensive beliefs. We discover certain needs, and in the measure of our satisfaction of them is the measure of our life. This satisfaction is obtained through the establishment of some *rapprochement* between the subject and the objective world or worlds in which it seeks to maintain itself. Those things which are found to satisfy the need, to fulfil desire, are accepted and clung to. They are, in fact, believed in. Without such belief one would be endeavouring to operate in a vacuum. This is vigorously and rightly insisted upon by the Pragmatists. The question of the organization within a scheme of values of these needs, vitally important though it be, is not one which concerns us here. It may be said in a parenthesis, however, that it is one to

which Pragmatists have not as yet in their metaphysical and epistemological discussions devoted sufficient attention. It is enough to point out in this place that there are needs of various kinds—physical, logical, æsthetic, and religious—and that in the experience of finding satisfaction for them we find belief. The belief emerges at that point where the desire which is the expression of the need finds the means of its adequate fulfilment. This applies, e.g., in the sphere of science, where we seek for a continuous and coherent system of objective fact, as in the sphere of religion, where we seek for an adequate support for our moral and spiritual needs (cf. Royce, *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 330 f.). We orientate ourselves in this direction or in that, according to the pressure of the need, by means of the power of attention (*q.v.*), which involves selection, self-determination. In brief, and in a somewhat misunderstood phrase, we 'will to believe.' This, of course, does not involve unchartered freedom or the introduction of sheer caprice. Our needs are not created by whims. They are the expressions of a nature striving to realize itself, and we but recognize their appearance. It is true that they may be regarded as the needs of a particular subject, and that the ends which they adumbrate are posited by that subject. But that does not necessarily involve us in indeterminism. Here, however, we are breaking ground upon the problem of Freedom. Keeping to our proper theme, we have further to observe that, though the end is posited by the subject and without prejudice to what is thereby implied, there is a certain objective limitation in the media through which it is to be realized. The nature of the process by which the end is attained is, so to speak, fixed independently of the subject. The subject finds it and accepts it as leading up to his end. The urgency of the need will no doubt often lead to the over-hasty and uncritical acceptance of means as real which further tests condemn, but the central element in these tests is just the need referred to; that which has been proved fictitious did not really meet the need. What is here said connects itself with the statement regarding the emotional factor, for the emotions are intimately connected with the furtherance or the obstruction of our conative tendencies.

(4) *Belief and personality*.—The stream of belief then is fed from various springs. We cannot truly say that it is a cognitive, an emotional, or a conative state, in the sense that it depends solely on any one of these forms of the conscious life. We believe with the whole, many-sided self. Belief expresses the definite attitude of the personality towards its experience. In Baldwin's definition of belief as the 'consciousness of the personal endorsement of reality' the adjective bears unusual fullness of meaning. 'Nulle manifestation de notre personnalité n'exprime plus adéquatement celle-ci que la croyance,' says Jules Payot (*La Croyance*, p. 173), and we may sum up this portion of our statement with his emphatic pronouncement: 'Nous croyons avec tout ce que nous sommes' (*ib.* p. 174).

(5) *The social factor*.—This reference to belief and personality introduces the mention of a factor in the constitution of belief which is of a different order from the above-mentioned, but which deserves special notice because of its import. This may be called the social factor. One of the most vital parts of that environment to which a man must make adjustments, in order to maintain and realize himself, is what we call the social environment, the *milieu* of personalities and their products in which we all find ourselves planted. Our equation to that is one of our great life-tasks. An important part of that environment is the body of

beliefs—including what are called superstitions, traditions, and prejudices—in which the communal life expresses itself. These we acquire for the most part unconsciously, as a portion of inherited experience, through our necessary participation in this life in its various forms—the family, the school, the Church—and in the common interchange of social talk. If and when we arrive at the self-conscious and reflective stage, these may be criticized and modified or abandoned. Their abandonment, even when a substitution is made, is as a rule achieved only after considerable effort. For on the abandonment follows a sense of the loss of something of that solidarity, of participation in the life of our society which is so necessary and precious to us. A barrier is placed between the 'unbeliever' or the 'doubter' and his fellows. Only the very strong or the very headstrong man will dare to erect it. And he will do so only on the assumption that the barrier is a temporary one. The fervour with which a novel idea or doctrine is promulgated is due largely to a desire to regain that sense of social support which for the time being has been lost through departing from generally accepted belief. Even so, the heretics and reformers must be a small minority in any society; to the great majority of its members the social sanction of a belief is so strong as to be practically invincible. The social need is imperative, and orthodoxy appears to them to be a necessary means to its satisfaction. The unfriendly attitude of the community or society towards the heterodox is in this regard intelligible. The insurgence of a small part against the whole threatens, or appears to threaten, the integrity of the whole; and this is, so far rightly, something to be thwarted and put down. In certain extreme cases the community places the heterodox and insurgents under constraint, by committing them to a prison or a lunatic asylum. Society, in any form, is then a great conservator of beliefs; and the social factor is one which cannot be neglected in tracing out the causes of belief.

(6) *Religious belief.*—The detailed discussion of various forms and stages of belief—the beliefs of primitive peoples, the superstitions of civilized man, belief in an objective world, in Nature as uniform and under law, belief in the objects and ideals of æsthetics, morals, and religion—would be a long and an arduous undertaking, and it would add nothing but illustrative material to the general discussion. One of these forms, however, calls for special remark for a special reason. Religious belief has sometimes, particularly, though not exclusively, by Catholic theologians, had a claim to uniqueness put forward on its behalf. It is suggested that it is not determined or built up in the same way as other modes of belief. Thus we find Newman, quoting Dmowski and others in support (*Grammar of Assent*, pp. 186-7), laying it down that there is a marked distinction between human or natural faith and Divine or supernatural faith—the latter being defined by him as 'the assent which follows on a Divine announcement, and is vivified by Divine grace.' This form of belief, it is maintained, differs from 'human' belief not merely in degree but in kind, being intrinsically superior to it. This superiority, it is further somewhat obscurely stated, is not a matter of experience, but is above experience. The distinction is one which depends on a metaphysical theory as to the ultimate source of belief. Dealing with the phenomena by the psychological method, we cannot say that religious belief reveals differences of such a kind as to compel us to isolate it completely from other forms. It undoubtedly differs in content, and this again no doubt

affects the intensity or quantitative character of the state, but in a psychological regard there is no deep-lying or fundamental qualitative distinction revealed. In this form of belief the reality referred to and endorsed is of a wider and more comprehensive character than that elsewhere dealt with. The issues involved are of a more tremendous and far-reaching kind. Life, in the light of religious belief, is no more the brief drama of an isolated self acted out against the shifting background of the world of time and space; it becomes part of an all-comprising reality, subsumed in the life of God. The narrow limits of the self are transcended; the personality is enriched and dignified by the sense of this; it acquires a fuller and more permanent value. It is intelligible how with the emergence of belief of this kind there comes the sense that salvation has been found. It is also intelligible how it should come about that such a belief is regarded as given to the subject, not formed by him. For the subject is not always clearly aware of all that is here set forth as contained in it. It does not, as a rule, come as the result of a clearly reasoned process, it usually arises out of a more or less inarticulate sense of great need, and in the measure of the need is the measure of the emotion accompanying the satisfaction of it; it is so powerful that it comes with a certain invasive character, it rushes in upon the subject. The believer has an overwhelming feeling of the reality of his experience. The investigation of the grounds of the belief is a matter for later reflexion; it is the business of the theologian and philosopher, who come in after the act of belief. Indeed, the individual believer may feel averse from any such reflexion or examination, on the ground that it tends to trouble and obscure the purity of the emotional state. Without prejudice to the question as to the rationality of religious belief, and dealing with it simply as it presents itself as a psychological phenomenon, we may say that here the emotional and volitional factors are markedly present, the intellectual factor playing apparently a minor rôle. The volitional factor has already been hinted at. The believer arrives at his belief by seeking, by turning himself in a certain direction, putting himself in a certain mental attitude. This, it may be, does not take place through the formation of a deliberately conceived and clearly conscious resolve, but it is nevertheless volitional. The believer finds because he seeks. There is nothing more constantly urged in the literature of religious belief than this, that the subject must act, he must turn his face in the right direction for the light to fall upon it. There is marked insistence also on the point that it is not by appealing to the reason directly, but in acting upon the will and the emotions, that religious belief is implanted and fostered. This is corroborated by psychological knowledge. It does not follow that this means an appeal to the irrational rather than to the rational in man. And when James speaks (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 73) of 'the inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief,' he is presumably referring to the articulately rational. As to the specific forms which religious belief may take, this obviously depends largely on the social factor, on the influence of the institutions, the forms of instruction, and the like, through which the society in which one lives expresses its religious consciousness, and realizes and satisfies its religious need. See also FAITH.

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G. F. Stout) art. 'Belief,' in *DHP*; A. J. Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*⁸, 1895; Bouillier, *La Vraie Conscience*, 1882, ch. xiii.; Brentano, *Psychol. vom empir. Standpunkte*, 1874, vol. i. bk. ii. ch. vii.; Brochard, *L'Erreur*, 1879; Fairbairn, *Catholicism, Roman and Anglican*, 1899; Fechner, *Drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens*, 1863; Flint, *Agnosticism*, 1903; Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, 1896, iii. ch. viii.; Höfding, *Outlines of Psychology*, 1891, V.D.; Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, pt. iii. §§ vii.-x., also *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, § v. pt. ii.; Iyerach, art. 'Belief,' in Hastings' *DCG*; James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1899, vol. ii. ch. xxi., also *The Will to Believe*, 1897, first four essays, and *Pragmatism*, 1907, esp. Lectures ii. and vi.-viii.; Köstlin, *Der Glaube*, 1859; Ollé Lapruné, *La Certitude Morale*, 1880; Leibniz, *Opera Philosophica* (ed. Erdmann), p. 442 f.; Lipps, *Grundriss der Seelenlehre*, 1883, ch. xvii.; Martineau, *Seat of Authority in Religion*³, 1891; James Mill, *Analysis of Phenomena of Human Mind*, 1829, ch. xi.; J. S. Mill, Note to James Mill's *Analysis*, ch. xi., also *Logic*, bk. i. ch. iv., *Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy*⁴, 1872, ch. xi., and *Dissertations*, 1859, ii.; Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, 1870; Payot, *La Croissance*, 1896; Perez, *L'Education des Belles Lettres*, 1880, pt. v. ch. iii.; Pickler, *Psychology of Belief in Objective Existence*, 1890; Rabier, *Psychologie*, 1884, chs. xxxi.-xxxii.; Renouvier, 'Psychologie rationnelle,' ii. pt. ii., in *Essais de critique générale*², 1875; Royce, *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 1885; Sabatier, *The Religions of Authority*, 1904; H. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*³, 1855, pt. vii. ch. 15; Sully, *Sensation and Intuition*, 1874, Essay iv., also *Human Mind*, 1892; Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, 1902, vol. i. bk. i. ch. v., and vol. ii. bk. ii. ch. xi.; Turner, *Knowledge, Belief, and Certitude*, 1900; Ulrici, *Glauben und Wissen*, 1853; Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, 1903; Waitz, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, 1849, § 36; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*², 1903, and art. 'Psychology,' in *EBR*¹⁰; J. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, 1907.

A. MAIR.

BELIEF (logical).—Belief, as the mere subjective correlate to reality in general, does not give rise to problems of logical method, though it may not be a 'sapless abstraction' within a system of epistemology, as Hegel considered it to be. Other contexts, however, raise questions as to the validity and tests of belief as compared with knowledge. Our cognitions are to some extent beyond test or challenge, being inevitable under the laws of sense intuition and understanding, or through the conscious sequences of experience; to some extent they can be tested in detail by appeal in each case to the unchallenged part of the cognitive system itself; and to some extent by appeal only to aspects of our complete nature which are over and above cognition itself. It would be convenient in logical discussion to use the term 'belief,' as distinguished from 'knowledge,' only for those cognitions which can be tested by the latter method. In this sense it would follow in general a distinction traceable from Kant, through Beneke, Ulrici, Adamson, James, Ormond (*Foundations of Knowledge*, pt. 3, ch. 1) and others, between objective and subjective 'grounds' of cognition. Belief so defined shares with knowledge the function of 'presenting to us realities, and thus influencing the passions and imagination'; and it may present them as primary or as inferences, and as certain or probable, whether sensible or super-sensible.

Laws of thought regarded as structural forms in the system of our cognitions are absolutely primal. It is only when thought includes expectation as to concrete matters of fact that any challenge is possible. Kant offered as a basis for expectation certain 'Principles of the Understanding'—the permanence of substance, the universality of law, and the inter-connexion of the world. If these Principles could be shown from the structural forms of cognition, they also would be beyond question. But subsequent developments of the Kantian epistemology admit that they cannot.

'We might have the right to say that the laws of space . . . must of necessity hold good of all objects of our experience, for nothing will ever make its way into experience without having been already moulded in that form of space through which alone it becomes an object for us at all. But we cannot attempt to prove in the same way that, unless there was a connection according to law in the real world, the experience which we possess would be impossible' (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349).

Empirical epistemology has come to the same final issue. Mill's attempt to justify logically the principle of the Uniformity of Nature, by appeal to accepted inductions of lower grade, has been repudiated by recent Empirical Logic (Mill, *Logic*, Bk. iii.; Venn, *Emp. Logic*, ch. 5). Expectation, therefore, is grounded in our complete nature, and its most general postulates are primary beliefs.

'A reign of law embracing all reality . . . is only an assumption with which every enlargement of experience is accompanied . . . an immediate confidence or faith . . . as is also the universal tendency of thought to turn the observed facts of co-existence into coherent connection' (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349).

Super-sensible realities also, so far as the plan of our complete nature requires that they shall 'be made present to us . . . and influence the passions and imagination,' are certified in belief. How far they are primary in relation to other contents of belief, how far they can be logically elaborated, and how far corroborated by the independent process of strict knowledge, must be considered in their own special literature. As primary, they are in line with the postulates of scientific expectation.

'We assume, on the one hand, that our perceptions submit to the claims of thought in so far as to allow of their being arranged in a conceptual system and in orderly connection; on the other hand, that all our actions can be subordinated to a single end. These assumptions are postulates, and our acceptance rests in the last instance upon our will' (Sigwart, *Logic*, § 62).

'If we require that the conception of the Universe be that of a whole and an essentially complete unit, and at the same time that it should comprehend all individuals, we follow in this and other requirements . . . the inspiration of a reason appreciative of worth' (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, ii. 5, § 2).

'If no better ground for accepting as fact a material world more or less in correspondence with our ordinary judgments of sense perceptions can be alleged than the practical need for doing so, there is nothing irrational in postulating a like harmony between the Universe and other Elements in our nature of a later, a more uncertain, but no ignoble growth' (Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*⁸, p. 391 f.).

'That there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony borne to the truth by the mind itself . . . is a normal but inevitable characteristic of the mental constitution of a being like man on a stage like the world' (Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, ch. ix. § 1).

Such quotations as these are not intended to appeal to an obtrusive 'wish' that becomes 'father to the thought,' or to a purposeful 'ignorance' that may be chosen as 'bliss,' but to a final trend of our spiritual development and to methodical analysis of the complete structure and function implied in it. Historic instances of such analysis are Butler's, for the purpose of 'showing moral obligation,' and Kant's, for establishing, through the primacy of Practical Reason, our judgments as to Freedom, God, and Immortality.

The topic 'belief' comes to be a doctrine of uncertainties, as in Locke, Beneke, Fechner, Ulrici, and James, when, instead of presenting a primary postulate or reality, it supplements knowledge in dealing with some detailed problem of science or life. Sometimes our complete nature guides the interest or interprets the final outcome of scientific inquiry; as in such conceptions as force, organic function, creation (Ulrici), or such principles as indestructibility of matter and conservation of energy (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, ch. 31). Sometimes it sustains scientific methods that are of themselves inconclusive; as in the analogy which attributes consciousness to other organisms than our own, or even to larger systems of Nature (Fechner). Sometimes it decides an option between alternative judgments which otherwise might remain always in problematic form, as between fatalism and personal responsibility (James, *The Will to Believe*). Sometimes it introduces inference to an otherwise alien region of fact, by supplying some mediating principle; as when history and prediction become possible through the postulate of the persistence of natural collocations and the recurrence of causes (Hughes, *Theory of Inference*, chs. 8-II; Sigwart, § 99). Sometimes it

opens empirical facts to explanation by reference to super-sensible realities; as in historical Free-choice or Miracles or Incarnation (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349, *Philos. of Rel.* § 62; Balfour, pt. 4, ch. 3).

Belief, like knowledge, may vary in certainty and influence and take special titles accordingly, without ceasing to be valid for human nature as such.

'In the empirical branches of knowledge,' Kant remarks, 'physics, psychology, and the like . . . we may have "Opinion," an assent which is consciously held as neither objectively nor subjectively adequate' . . . while 'of many cognitions we are conscious only in such a manner as not to be able to judge whether the grounds of our assent are objective or subjective . . . and this is "Persuasion." Both fall short of Conviction, whether logical Conviction, that is, Knowledge, or practical, that is, Belief; because they are not "necessary"' (*Introduction to Logic*).

But belief, unlike knowledge, may be valid for rational nature as such, without being valid for all persons. The individual mind realizes its development under conditions much more special than those for the racial or collective mind, and admits details not admitted into the cognitive system common to all. Among the examples are the following: (1) Our common cognition assumes that objects of thought are not altered by the mere event of their being thought of (Venn, *Empirical Logic*, ch. 2); yet for the individual mind this postulate may be suspended in favour of maxims of expectation that lead to their own fulfilment. Such are the mutual confidence of social co-operation, self-reliance in personal enterprise, hope during illness (James); and, on a higher level, our assumption of moral sufficiency for an occasion, or of personal acceptance with the Divine Being. (2) The option of uncertainties must often be closed for the individual, though remaining still open for science or for common belief. Inferences that are 'informal,' and under the sanction of an 'illative sense' like the insight or 'tact' of an expert, must be substituted for explicit thought. In practical discretion, taste, conscientious scruple, and personal faith we must thus interpret our own personal nature (Newman, chs. 8 and 9; Gernar, *Glauben oder Wissen*, 1856). (3) External authority must be accepted in default of personal inference; the spirit of our time, the dogmas of specialists in science, testimony for historical events, moral conventions, creeds of the Churches (Balfour).

As possible principles for constructing a scale of certainty in belief, have been suggested: (a) the narrowness of the void in our scheme of reality which is left by strict knowledge; (b) the finality, in value for development, of the subjective need which attempts to fill it; (c) the intrinsic inaccessibility of the void to knowledge itself (Beneke).

LITERATURE.—See end of preceding article.

J. BROUGH.

BELIEF (theological). — See AGNOSTICISM, ATHEISM, and especially FAITH.

BELLS.—See GONGS AND BELLS.

BENARES.—I. Name and history.—Benares (Banāras), the largest city in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh except Lucknow, is situated in the Benares District (lat. 25° 18' N., long. 83° 3' E.), on the left bank of the Ganges, which flows past the city for a distance of nearly 3½ miles. The river bends to the N.E., so that the city stands for the most part on the N.W. bank, which is in places 100 feet high. A census taken in 1803, which gave the population as 582,000, was vitiated by the assumption that twenty persons should be assigned to each house. The true population (1901) is returned as 209,331, comprising: Hindus, 153,821; Musalmāns, 53,566; Christians, about 1200, chiefly in the cantonment, civil station, and mission grounds; with a few adherents of other religions.

VOL. II.—30

At the present day Hindus speak of the city, which is acknowledged to be the religious capital of Hinduism ('the general school of the Gentiles, the Athens of India,' to use Bernier's words), indifferently as either *Kāśī* or *Banāras*, but the latter name, anglicized as *Benares*, is that commonly used by people of other nationalities and in literature.

The name *Kāśī* (*Kāśi*, in Pāli *Kāśi*) was originally the name of a tribe or nation inhabiting the country between the Ganges and Ghāghrā (Gogra), and at times apparently extending its authority over territory to the north of the Ghāghrā and the south of the Ganges. Legends of *Kāśī Rājā* are current in the Gorakhpur District, north of the Ghāghrā, and the small town of Rūdarpur in that district is said to bear the alternative name of *Kāśi* (Martin, *Eastern India*, ii. 338). To the south of the Ganges, the Karamnāsā river, now forming part of the boundary between the Mirzāpur and Shāhābād Districts, was recognized traditionally as the frontier between the kingdom of the *Kāśis* (Benares) and that of the Magadhas (S. Bihār). The waters of that river are regarded by high-caste Hindus from other regions as impure and polluting. We shall presently quote another legend in proof of the aversion felt by orthodox Hindus towards the non-Aryan, Buddhist kingdom of Māgadha. The Rāmāyana (*Uttarakāṇḍa*, lix. 18, 19) describes the 'excellent town' of Pratiṣṭhāna, that is to say Jhūsi opposite Allahābād, as being situated in the 'Kāśi kingdom.' Putting all indications together, we may conclude that the realm of the *Kāśis* was equivalent to the modern Districts of Benares, Ghāzipur, Balliā, Azamgarh, and Jaunpur, together with portions of the Mirzāpur, Gorakhpur, Allāhābād, Partābgarh, Sultānpur, and Fyzābād Districts, all of which are now included in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The *Kāśi* people are mentioned by Pāṇini and other authors in both Sanskrit and Pāli prior to the Christian era. Gradually the name was transferred from the people to their capital city, and the transition is marked in the *Bṛhat Samhitā*, an early work, which applies the name *Kāśi* to both people and city. The *Kāśis* lost their independence at an early date, their kingdom being absorbed by Northern Kosala (Oudh) before the time of Buddha. An ancient Kosalan king, named Kanisa, of uncertain date, is described as 'the conqueror of *Kāśi*.' Nevertheless, the older Buddhist books include *Kāśi* in the list of the sixteen principal States of India, although it was never independent in historical times. Gradually the name *Kāśi* or *Kāśī* (Pāli *Kāśi*) was transferred from the tribe to the city. The form *Kāśikā* also occurs.

The alternative name *Varāṇasī* (also *Vārāṇasī*, *Varaṇasī*) appears to be more ancient than *Kāśi* as the designation of the city, and to be really its proper name. The Buddhist Jātakas and early Sanskrit books describe the city of *Varāṇasī* as being situated in the *Kāśi* country. Fa-hien, the Chinese pilgrim (A.D. 400), writes the name as *Po-lo-nai*, which seems to correspond with a spoken form *Bārānas*. Hsien Tsiang (Yuan Chwang, A.D. 637) writes *Po-lo-na-se* (= *Vārāṇasī* or *Bārāṇasī*). Popular etymology derives the name *Banāras* (by metathesis of *Bārānas*), either from an imaginary Rājā *Banār* or from a combination of the names of the rivers *Varaṇā* (*Barnā*) and *Asi* or *Asī*, but neither derivation can be accepted. In the Purāṇas the name *Avimukta* is given to the city, which is mentioned in the Buddhist Jātakas under various fanciful names, *Sudassana*, *Pupphavati*, etc.

Local tradition restricts the name of *Banāras* to the northern and apparently most ancient part of the city, the central block, also ancient, being